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Abstract. In 2014, some significant geopolitical changes in the region of Central and Eastern Europe took 
place.  After the so-called Euromaidan events in Ukraine, Moscow took advantage of the situation and annexed 
the Crimean peninsula. The global agenda was dominated by the discussions about “hybrid war”, “information 
warfare,” etc. It was obvious that the Kremlin used propaganda in its operation in Crimea in order to manipulate 
the public opinion and to include ethnic minorities (Russian-speaking inhabitants of Crimea) into its games.
In the above context of Kremlin’s practice of involving compatriots from near abroad (including Lithuania) 
into geopolitical processes, as well as facing the challenge of propaganda, it is important to look how the 
events in Ukraine were covered in the Russian-language newspapers in Lithuania. The materials of research 
become publications in the weeklies “Litovskij kurjer”, “Obzor”, and “Ekspress-nedelia”. The question of 
the research was: did these newspapers use narratives of the Kremlin propaganda, and if so, how strong was 
the representation of these narratives?
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Po Maidano protestų sekusių įvykių ir Krymo aneksijos pateikimas vietiniuose 
laikraščiuose rusų kalba Lietuvoje (2014 m., kovas)
Santrauka. 2014 metais Centrinės ir Rytų Europos regione įvyko reikšmingi geopolitiniai pokyčiai. Po va-
dinamųjų Maidano įvykių Ukrainoje Maskva pasinaudojo situacija ir aneksavo Krymo pusiasalį. Šia įvykiai 
paskatino moksliniame ir ekspertiniame pasaulyje atnaujinti aktyvesnes diskusijas apie tokius reiškinius kaip 
„informacinis karas“, „hibridinis karas“ ir pan. Buvo pastebėta, jog vykdydamas operaciją Kryme Kremlius 
aktyviai naudojo propagandos priemones, siekdamas manipuliuoti vietinių gyventojų nuomone bei savotiškai 
įtraukdamas rusakalbius Krymo gyventojus į savo žaidimą. 
Suprantant šiuolaikinės Kremliaus propagandos keliamą pavojų, kaip ir bandymą įtraukti užsienyje (taip pat 
ir Lietuvoje) gyvenančius tėvynainius į tam tikrus geopolitinius procesus, verta išanalizuoti, kokiu būdu Kry-
mo aneksijos įvykiai buvo pateikti vietinėje rusakalbėje spaudoje Lietuvoje. Tyrimo objektu tapo rusakalbiai 
savaitraščiai „Litovskij kurjer“, „Obzor“ ir „Ekspress-nedelia“. Tyrimo metu buvo siekta nustatyti, ar minėtų 
įvykių pateikime buvo naudojami atitinkami Kremliaus propagandos naratyvai? Taip pat buvo siekta nustatyti, 
kiek plačiai tokio pobūdžio naratyvai buvo atspindėti vietinės rusakalbės spaudos publikacijose. 
Raktiniai žodžiai: propaganda, hibridinis karas, tautinės mažumos, žiniasklaida, Rusijos Federacija, Lietuva
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Introduction
The Revolution of Dignity in Kiev and Russia’s reaction to it (annexation of Crimea, 
support of separatists in the Donbass region) changed the geopolitical situation in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE). The 2013-14 events became a point of critical changes in the 
post-Soviet area. Russia demonstrated its readiness to fight for the zone of influence not 
only verbally, but also practically. 
The Euromaidan events in Ukraine were a signal not only for Kiev. The revival of 
imperial ambitions in the Russian Federation changed security situation in the entire CEE 
region. These changes were quite predictable. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Moscow shows a special attention to the post-Soviet area and countries of a former com-
munist block (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, etc). The post-Soviet space has been of 
particular importance for the Russian authorities, since Moscow perceives this region as 
the sphere of its direct geopolitical influence. 
The Baltic States form an exception from this geopolitical status quo. Occupied and 
incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1940, these republics were perceived rather as “aliens” 
(Laurinavičius, Motieka, Statkus, 2005). There was a wide-scale resistance movement in 
the Baltic States against the Soviet occupation during and after the World War II (1944-
1953). Later, under the Soviet rule, the societies of the Baltic States strove to preserve their 
identities and hoped to reclaim freedom. For instance, Lithuania was the first among the 
Soviet republics to declare the re-establishment of its Independence on 11 March 1990. 
Similarly to Estonia and Latvia, independent Lithuania opted for integration into the 
Western  structures. This choice disregarded the position of Russia. Its authorities were in 
fact quite unhappy with the developments in the Baltic States, but “allowed” them to join 
the European Union and the NATO in 2004 when the confrontation between Russia and 
the so-called “West” was quite low.  However, the accession of the Baltic States in these 
Western alliances did not mean that Russia withdrew its ambitions to have geopolitical 
control over these three countries. Therefore, Lithuania remains among the countries 
which Russian authorities would like to see as the area of their geopolitical influence.
Lithuania in the orbit of Russia’s influence
Lithuania and the Russian Federation belong to different geopolitical areas. Moscow lives 
in the realm of its new imperial illusions. Lithuania joined the European Union and the 
NATO and has established itself as an integral part of the political “West”. It does not mean 
that Moscow supports the Lithuanian decision about choosing its geopolitical allies. For 
example, before Lithuania’s accession to the NATO, Russia had tried to scuttle the idea 
of the Baltic States integrating in this organization (Martišius, 2010, p. 137). 
Scholars stress different types of Russian influence in Lithuania. Organized and objec-
tive influence is transmitted through Russia’s foreign policy and soft power. Vitkus (2006, 
p. 49) defines the following domains of this influence:
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• Accusation of the violation the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities1
• Support of the so-called “compatriots”2
• Cultural dimension
• Education dimension
• Russian media 
Russia tries to keep Lithuania in its zone of geopolitical influence. Before 2014, the 
main strategy of Moscow was to use the area of foreign affairs and soft power to “con-
trol” Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia. Russia tried to prove that the Baltic States 
are “not democratic” countries and stress that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia violated the 
rights of their Russian-speaking minorities. Th core of this strategy was to segregate the 
Baltic States from the Western World and to provoke mistrust between them and their 
partners in Europe. 
The strategy of soft power means that Russia tries to keep its influence in the area of 
humanitarian dimension. For it, Moscow used historically established ties. In fact, “Russia 
has a competitive advantage for its humanitarian policies in the post-Soviet sphere due to 
objective reasons: Russian compatriots living in this region, the popularity of Russian mass 
culture, and the spread of Russian Orthodox Christianity” (Pelnens (ed), 2009, p. 203).
The Kremlin developed a concept of  the “Russian World” for own soft power needs. 
Unlike the conception of compatriots, the “Russian World” definition is not enshrined in 
the law and provide opportunities for broad interpretation by every actor. In fact, this is 
an exterritorial concept which united all Russian-speaking people (compatriots) beyond 
the borders of the Russian Federation (Tishkov, 2007). As Nerijus Maliukevicius noticed, 
“the Russian World as an ideology for Russian soft power has a huge potential because 
of its positive integrating capacity as opposed to the traditional anti-Western rhetoric” 
(Maliukevičius, 2013, p. 80). 
However, in 2014, the situation changed dramatically. The aggression of the Russian 
Federation against Ukraine embodied in the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and 
support of the separatists in the Donbas region showed that the ”Russian World” is the 
not only a soft power concept. Russia used this concept in its hybrid warfare operation 
in Ukraine. After that the “Russian World” become a marker of threat. In the Ukrainian 
context, Russia put the “Russian World” as an alternative to the “Euromaidan” (Shulga, 
1 In fact, here we are talking not about an ethnic minority but about a minority with common tradition and ex-
perience, dependent of mother tongue. As Justyna Oledzka wrote: “Language is the basis for enabling the creation 
of a common group of a people’s history, religion and traditions. Through it, a mentality and axiology common to 
the members of the group is created, which enables them to integrate into specific social structures” (Oledzka, 2017, 
p. 138).
2  The compatriots is the definition from Federal low of the Russian Federation. By the law, compatriots are “ the 
citizens of the Russian Federation who are constantly living outside the territory of the Russian Federation ”, and 
also “the people which are historically living in the territory of the Russian Federation are also recognized and also 
persons who made free choice for benefit of spiritual, cultural and legal bond with the Russian Federation, whose rel-
atives on the direct ascending line lived in the territory of the Russian Federation earlier” including former citizens 
of USSR (Federalnyj zakon…, 1999 (2002)). Lithuanian scholar Dovile Jakniuniene explained that “compatriots” 
are a group of people who identify themselves with the Russian Federation as state and the cultural idea, but not with 
Russia’s current territory (Jakniunaite, 2007, p. 147). Russian language is the main distinctive marker of this group. 
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2015, p. 235). Moscow explained its aggression against Ukraine in terms of necessity to 
defend its compatriots, i.e. representatives of the “Russian World”.
Russia uses the concept of Russian World globally. After 2014 Russia’s soft power 
changed towards much more open information and propaganda warfare. Lithuania and 
the Baltic States in general were the first countries of the political “West” affected by it. 
The growing threat of Russia’s activities in 2014 was mentioned inter alia by the State 
Security Department of Lithuania in its annual public report (VSD, 2014, p. 9-10). 
It is obvious that Moscow could try to use the hybrid warfare strategy not only against 
Ukraine but also against other countries in its immediate neighborhood. Lithuania poten-
tially belongs to the zone of the risk. Therefore, it is important to evaluate possible threats. 
For this purpose, the lessons of Crimea should be analyzed.
The lessons of Crimea 
The annexation of Crimea gives many lessons pertinent to information warfare. Russia 
organized a broad informational support of its aggression against Ukraine. Russia’s main 
goal of was to camouflage the real armed aggression in Ukraine. 
One can distinguish three stages of Russia’s operation against Ukraine. 
The first stage is linked with the reaction of Russia’s authorities to the Euromaidan 
events in Kiev. Moscow tried to be an actor in the Ukrainian agenda. It was a question of 
geopolitical influence in the neighboring country. For this purpose the Kremlin tried to use 
all leverages it had. According to Darczewska (2014, p. 5) Russia’s activities in Ukraine 
during the Euromaidan times were “combined with ideological, political and socio-cultural 
sabotage, provocation and diplomatic activity”.  The main goal of the Kremlin was to 
keep the “pro-Russian” and controllable Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in power. 
Some commentators believe that the Kremlin could have different strategies in Ukrai-
nian situation. For instance, Edward Lucas and Peter Pomeranzev (2016, p. 15) suggest: 
By associating the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine with fascism and an anti-Russian, 
Western-backed coup, Russia hopes to galvanize its own domestic audience behind its assertive 
foreign policy. Similarly, it hopes to radicalize potential supporters in eastern and southern 
Ukraine to bolster its military campaign there. Finally, Russia hopes to discredit the Ukrainian 
government in the eyes of Europe and NATO.
However, after Yanukovych’s escape the situation significantly changed. At this second 
stage the Kremlin understood that it was about to lose a battle in Kiev. This, however, 
provided Russia with new geopolitical opportunities. One of these opportunities was to 
organize the annexation of Crimea. In fact, Russian authorities used the Euromaidan con-
text for their own purposes. As Cepuritis (2015, p. 149) concludes,  “Euromaidan protests 
turned to riots, and riots turned to tragedy, creating the perfect moment for Russia to annex 
Crimea and escalate military hostilities in Eastern parts of Ukraine”.
In Crimea, Moscow showed a new strategy, which quite soon was named a “hybrid 
warfare” (Ibid, p. 152). This strategy could be explained as the combination of information 
and disinformation campaigns used together with (camouflaged) military actions. Hence, 
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to justify the annexation of Crimea, Russia used a series of absurd propaganda narratives, 
such as “Banderivtsy could storm into Crimea”, “the Black Sea Fleet bases could be taken 
over by NATO”, or “Ukrainian citizens could be de-Russified” (Darczewska, 2014, p. 5).
The third stage was a strategy to entrench the fact of annexation. For the domestic 
audience, the Kremlin used the traditional “fear of the West” in a broad historical context. 
According to Darczewska, (2016, p. 32), “[s]ince the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 
2003/4, Russia has been exploiting ever more intensively the threats stemming from the 
“export of Western democracy”, and today it insists on presenting its armed interventions 
in Crimea and Donbas as a kind of liberation mission aimed at freeing Ukraine from US 
dominance”.  
For the foreign audience, another version was used. The Kremlin tried to promote 
its own “truth.” The so-called Crimean referendum held on 16 March 2014 was used as 
the argument to legitimize the aggression  (Berzins, 2015, p. 43). As Lucas and Nummo 
(2015, p. 13) underline, “even if Western audiences only come to believe that there are 
two sides to the story – say, on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine – then the Kremlin has 
already won an important victory”.
Information manipulation aimed at the local population was another important aspect 
of the “hybrid warfare” usage in Crimea. As Darczewska (2016, p. 6) explains:
The Crimean operation perfectly shows the essence of information warfare: the victim of the 
aggression – as was the case with Crimea – does not resist it. This happened because Russian-
speaking citizens of Ukraine who had undergone necessary psychological and informational 
treatment (intoxication) took part in the separatist coup and the annexation of Crimea by Russia.
It also could explain the impulsive decision made by Moscow. As Latvian researcher 
Andis Kudors (Kudors, 2015, p. 167) observed: “It is possible the decision to annex 
Crimea was made suddenly by the Kremlin, however, Russian compatriots’ organisations 
in Ukraine had been preparing for the possibility of such a step for a number of years 
already” .
Russian media have also played a significant role in information warfare against 
Ukraine in 2014 and later. It was the main channel of influence for the local Russian-
speaking population in Crimea. Some commentators argue that “in Russia’s hybrid war 
against Ukraine, media play the principal role” (Ibid, p. 164). Hence, it was a tool used 
for destabilization of the situation in Ukraine (Darczewska, 2014, p. 6).
It also important to mention that Moscow did not stop after Crimea. It is obvious that 
“spurred on by the Crimean success, the Russian leadership then embarked on the Don-
bas adventure” (Kažocinš, 2015, p. 54). The confrontation between the Ukrainian state 
forces and the so-called separatists supported by Russia in the Eastern part of Ukraine 
still have no solution. 
The main lesson of the Crimean events is that Russia is ready to cross the “red lines” in 
foreign affairs and geopolitical domain. It means that none of the neighboring states could 
feel safe in the Russia’s vicinity. This poses the actual challenge not only for Lithuania 
but also for other Baltic States because “similar Russian media and “compatriots” policy 
methods used in Ukraine before and after the annexation of Crimea, are also used in the 
Baltic States” (Kudors, 2015, p. 168). 
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Scholars stress that success of the Crimean annexation could inspire Russian officials 
to new geopolitical adventures. Lithuania and other Baltic States belong to the immediate 
risk zone, because “it might tempt President Putin to use his doctrine of protecting ethnic 
Russians and Russian speakers in seeking territorial changes elsewhere in the neighbor-
hood, including in the Baltic States, provoking a direct challenge to NATO” (Daadler 
etc, 2015, p. 5).
It means that all types of Russian information activities in Lithuania, Latvia, and Esto-
nia should be analyzed, including the coverage of the Euromaidan events in Ukraine and 
the subsequent annexation of Crimea in local Russian-language newspapers in Lithuania. 
This research is important as it addresses the issues of information security and Moscow’s 
possibility to appeal to the Russian-speaking minorities for support of Russian geopolitical 
capers. This is particularly important because Russian turned Russian language into the 
tool of its geopolitical influence on the post-Soviet area (Oledzka, 2017).
The coverage of Ukrainian events in March 2014
The scope of the Russian-language press in Lithuania is quite small. There are three 
main nation-wide weekly newspapers well-known among the readers since the 1990s: 
“Litovskij kurjer” (“Lithuanian courier”), “Obzor” (“Overview”), “Ekspress-nedelia” 
(“Express-week”). These three publications are the main print media for Russian-speaking 
community in Lithuania.
The annexation of Crimea was the main media topic in March 2014. The Russian-
language press could not ignore these events as well. Thus, the main point of the research 
was to answer the question: how did the Russian-language newspapers of Lithuania cover 
the annexation of Crimea?
The methods of the research were a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the docu-
ments (articles). The quantitative part of the research allowed to determine aspects of 
coverage of chosen events in the agenda of Russian-language newspapers in Lithuania. 
Qualitative analysis of the texts allowed to explore links of the content of published ar-
ticles to one or another version of events (i.e., from the side of Russia, from the side of 
Ukraine etc.) as well as links to narratives of the Kremlin propaganda. 
Twelve issues of the newspapers, in which 66 texts3 about Ukrainian events were found 
(see Table 1), were analyzed. The number of publications in the three titles was distributed 
as follows: Ekspress-nedelia” (27 texts), followed by “Obzor” (26 texts) and “Litovskij 
kurjer” with only half as much as two other newspapers (13 texts). 
In the research attention was focused on the question whether publications covered the 
Ukrainian events in general, or specifically focused on the Crimean events? This aspect 
is particularly important if we focus on the chronological development of the situation. 
In March 2014, the Euromaidan protests were already over. The protesters won, but the 
power in the country lacked stability. Thus, this factor was used by Russia in its activities 
3  The subject of analysis becomes all publications (informational articles, analytical articles, opinion columns, 
interviews) which match the topic.  
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aimed at the annexation of Crimea. One can assume that the news about Crimea should 
dominate in the agenda of the media during this period. However, we can observe that 
the Russian-language newspapers in Lithuania prefer to write about Ukraine in general, 
while the Crimean events drew significantly less attention (see Figure 2). In fact, a similar 
trend can be observed in both “Obzor” and “Litovskij kurjer” (1/3 about Crimea v. 2/3 



























 Fig. 2. Proportion of publications about Euromaidan/Ukraine events and the Crimean events
Source: research data
4 “Careful” means here that if the Euromaidan events are be interpreted in different ways and depicted as 
controversial,- it is could be much more difficult to provide similar interpretation of the Crimean events. The 
Kremlin’s version  of the events just confirmed that Moscow obviously lied. Under such circumstances, it was not 
comfortable for the Russian-languages newspapers in Lithuania to transmit the Kremlin’s view of the Crimean 
events. This could explain a little attention to it.
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The research primarily strove to answer the question of which position the newspapers 
transmitted while covering these events. The main professional principle for journalists 
and publishers is to try to be as much objective as possible. 
As for the Ukrainian events (including those in Crimea), one could observe least two 
positions. The first one was the official position of Ukraine, formed by the Ukrainian 
parliament after Yanukovych’s escape.  In fact, this position was supported by Europe 
and Lithuania. Vilnius recognized the new Ukrainian government, and the win of the 
Euromaidan was interpreted as the victory of democracy. 
The second position was the position of the Russian Federation. In fact, it was clearly 
reflected by the propaganda narratives which the Kremlin used during the period. Rus-
sians argued that the events in Kyiv were in fact a coup. They portrayed the protests as not 
peaceful and headed by “Nazis”, “Nationalists” and “Banderovtsy” (Ukrainian nationalists, 
followers of the ideas of Stepan Bandera). Russia claimed that the new government was 
illegal and still acknowledged Viktor Yanukovych as a legitimate president.  
Similar differences could be observed in positions pertinent to the Crimean events. 
Ukraine insisted on the fact of Russia’s invasion and annexation of the peninsula. Lithu-
ania (as all the political “West”) also supported this interpretation of events. 
Moscow tried to mask own steps and actions. Russia denied the activities of its its 
armed forces in the Crimean peninsula. The annexation of Crimea was presented as “a 
free choice” of its inhabitants. 
Additionally, we observe the  third professional position of the media, when it repre-
sented different points of view or just the objective facts.  This position could be as either 
“Objective”, or “Neutral”. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of these positions in the publications of the three Lithu-

























 Fig. 3. Representation of different positions in publications
Source: research data
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It could be seen that all newspapers tried to comply with the principles of objectivity 
and neutrality5. However, it seems interesting to focus on the correlation between the 
numbers of publications which represented different positions. Only in the “Ekspress-
nedelia” the Lithuanian (i.e. Ukrainian) and the Russian positions were presented in equal 
proportion. In other two newspapers the Kremlin position prevailed. 
The research also showed that during the period in question the newspapers transmitted 
the narratives used by the Kremlin propaganda against Ukraine. The messages of these 
narratives and their distribution between the three newspapers in question are illustrated 
in Table 1.




Only Yanukovych is a legitimate president + + +
Anti-constitutional coup in Ukraine + + +
The “Right Sector” (as main hostile power at Euromaidan) + + +
The Russian army doesn’t act in Crimea + + +
Protesters at Euromaidan uses nationalistic Bandera’s ideology + +
Protesters at Euromaidan are extremists and radicals + +
Euromaidan events is fault of EU + +
Nationalists and neo-Nazis at the Euromaidan + +
Antisemitism of the Euromaidan protesters + +
Protesters at the Euromaidan use “Nazi/SS” slogans +
People get payed for participation in the Euromaidan protests +
Snipers provoked the Euromaidan protesters +
Nationalists in Ukraine will attack/fight against the representati-
ves of Russian (Russian-speaking) minority +
Kiev could not handle the threat of ultra-nationalists +
In Kiev new oligarchic regime emerges +
Referendum in Crimea is legal and democratic +
This information can be seen as a certain ranking of the Kremlin propaganda narra-
tives, used in Lithuanian Russian-language newspapers in the context of the Ukrainian 
events. The most popular narratives, repeated in all three newspapers emphasized that 
“only Yanukovych was a legitimate president”, that the “anti-constitutional coup” was 
taking place in Kiev, whereas the Ukrainian patriotic “Right Sector” movement was por-
trayed as the “main hostile power in the Euromaidan”. Moreover, publications in all the 
newspapers claimed that “the Russian army did not act in Crimea”. 
5  The objectivity and neutrality is difficult conceptions for research because opens the way for some bias 
depended on subjectivity of researcher. The “objectivity” understood here as obligation of journalist to “attempt 
to find out what really happened” (Randall, 2011, p. 148), and non-objectivity interpreted as act of providing false 
(fake) information and narratives of Kremlin propaganda.  
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Another type of the Kremlin propaganda narratives became quite popular. Two of  the 
three newspapers reported about the alleged “Nationalism”, “Nazism” and “Antisemitism” 
among the Euromaidan protesters. The publications “explained” that the street protesters 
used “Bandera’s ideology”, that they are “extremists and radicals”, and even that all the 
Euromaidan events are, in fact, “the fault of the European Union”. 
The texts by the Obzor contain more examples of the Kremlin propaganda. For ex-
ample, its authors wrote that “people got paid for participation in the Maidan protests” 
and even that it was not “Berkut” snipers who shot to the protesters, but unknown snipers 
from the Euromaidan side. 
Conclusions
In its hybrid war against Ukraine in 2014, Russia used a broad variety of information 
aggression tools and propaganda techniques.  The reflections of these activities could 
be found in the Russian-language newspapers in Lithuania. The results of this research 
demonstrated that: 
1.  The local Russian-language newspapers showed wired attention to general Ukrai-
nian events in 2014, whereas the events in Crimea drew much less attention.
2.  All the newspapers in question tried to create an illusion of objectivity and balance 
in providing their readers with information. However, a rather balanced coverage 
of the Ukrainian events could be observed only in the “Ekspress-nedelia”
3.  All the newspapers were, in fact, providers of the Kremlin propaganda narratives 
used against Ukraine in its hybrid war. The research identified 16 types of these 
narratives. Seven narratives were presented in the “Litovskij kurjer,” nine – in the 
“Ekspress-nedelia”, and 13 in the “Obzor”.
4.  The coverage of the Ukrainian events puts these newspapers as a potential factor 
of risk in the context of state’s (information) security and stability. On the one 
hand, their publications demonstrated lack of informational loyalty to Lithuania 
and orientation towards Russian information space. On the one hand, they showed 
a possibility of exerting influence on the Russian-speaking minority groups in 
Lithuania. 
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